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Abstract
Despite the growing interest in research on the topic of internal control, there is 
confusion about the concept in both theory and practice. This study addresses this 
lack of clarity by systematically structuring the literature that uses the concept by 
investigating what we know from previous studies about the practice of internal con-
trol and how it is institutionalized. To examine the existing literature in this field, 
the paper utilizes the theoretical lens of ‘institutional work’. The review finds that 
the understanding of internal control is currently divided: one part of the literature 
understands the concept as internal control over financial reporting, while the other 
part has a more global and strategic understanding of the term. Internal control is 
institutionalized by different organizational actors at the micro level in an attempt 
to implement internal control systems that are not a simple act of compliance but 
present an added value for the organization. At the same time, it is noteworthy that 
not all categories of institutional work could be identified in the internal control lit-
erature, indicating that the actors are largely limited by their institutional embed-
dedness. The paper also presents an aggregated understanding of the term internal 
control, which can therefore significantly supplement the efforts of practitioners and 
regulators to implement internal control procedures that add value for the corporate 
governance of organizations.
Keywords Internal control · Corporate governance · Institutional work · Systematic 
literature review
JEL Classification M4 · M42 · M48
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Research on internal control is increasing and has focused on many different aspects 
of the subject, such as the design and implementation of internal controls (e.g. Dikan 
et al. 2014; Bogdan 2014), the determinants (e.g. Jokipii 2010), as well as the effect 
that internal controls (or the lack of) have on organizations (e.g. Lee et  al. 2016; 
Brown and Lim 2012). However, continuing scandals and failures in many compa-
nies around the globe (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Volkswagen) show that the issue of 
risk and how to mitigate it through internal control efforts is far from resolved. The 
purpose of this study is to provide a systematic literature review that investigates the 
different streams and meanings of internal control in the research. This review goes 
beyond other systematic reviews in the field by employing a theoretical framework 
that enables a content analysis of what internal control means in practice.
The practices of internal control and management control are closely connected. 
While management control aims at steering organizations through the organizational 
environment toward the achievement of both short-term and long-term goals (Otley 
and Soin 2014), internal control contributes to this process by providing reasonable 
assurance regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliable financial 
reporting, and compliance with laws, regulations and policies (COSO 2013). Yet, 
while Otley and Soin (2014) identify both corporate governance and risk manage-
ment as emerging trends within the field of management control, Speklé and Kruis 
(2014) find that this is not quite as simple with internal control. One of the problems 
for researchers and practitioners relates to the fact that the understanding of the term 
internal control that is institutionalized through legal requirements such as the Sar-
banes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 in the USA and the 2015 Audit Directive in the EU 
is substantially different from other official guidelines and frameworks that define 
internal control in a more holistic way (e.g., COSO, or the Three Lines of Defense 
Model).
This inconsistency between the provided frameworks and legal requirements 
for organizations inherently leads to various interpretations of the term in both 
the academic and the professional literature (Holm and Laursen 2007). Such 
inconsistency also leads to a potential problem for the user of the internal con-
trol reports, such as when trying to link the terminology that is used in audi-
tors’ reports back to that which is used in the professional literature or published 
guidelines and standards (Boritz et al. 2013). The management control literature 
tends to understand the term as a ‘narrower scope definition of management con-
trol’ or the process of ‘strategy implementation’ (Merchant and Otley 2007) and 
thereby sees internal control as a basis of information that feeds into both the 
strategic control (external focus) and the management control (internal focus) 
systems of an organization (Pfister 2009). Other authors, however, believe that 
internal control is a much more holistic concept. Power (2007), for instance, 
states that internal control is nowadays much more an extension of risk manage-
ment than an instrument of control and reaches ‘into every corner of organiza-
tional life’ (p. 63). Spira and Page (2003) similarly argue that internal control can 
be viewed as a ‘risk treatment’ that is increasingly institutionalized as a form of 
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enterprise risk management. Finally, there is the literature on financial reporting 
(see e.g. Schneider et al. 2009), which is heavily influenced by the requirements 
of the SOX and therefore perceives internal control merely as a tool to assure 
that financial reports are of high quality, with a focus on potential material weak-
nesses in those reports.
Previous literature reviews on the topic of internal control have focused exclu-
sively on the literature that relates internal control to financial reporting (Schneider 
et al. 2009) or internal control audits (Kinney et al. 2013) under SOX in the United 
States. In an attempt to provide a more comprehensive and timely understanding of 
the term ‘internal control,’ Chalmers et al. (2019) extend these reviews by includ-
ing literature that was published in settings outside the United States. While their 
study provides a deeper understanding of the determinants and consequences of 
internal control for financial reporting on an international level, it remains limited by 
its focus on internal control reporting. The fact that internal control is often under-
stood in broader terms (see e.g. Kinney 2000) justifies a literature review approach 
that includes research on internal control with a wider focus on the efficiency of 
operations. Moreover, while we know much about the potential determinants and 
outcomes of having an efficient internal control system, there is a lack of research on 
the actual practice of internal control and how managers and employees work with 
the system so that it actually becomes an added value for companies. Analyzing the 
existing literature with a deeper focus on the actual work of internal control is there-
fore beneficial, as it allows one to analyze how people work with internal control in 
practice while at the same time offering a global understanding of the term internal 
control. For this purpose, I argue that the theoretical lens of institutional work, as 
suggested by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006), will add a new perspective to the study 
of internal control. The theory suggests that individuals are able to create, maintain, 
and disrupt institutions by interacting with pressure from the institutional environ-
ment, making it possible to learn about the practice of internal control and how it is 
institutionalized.
The review identifies 135 studies that were published between 2000 and 2019 
and focus on various aspects of the term internal control, including the relationship 
between internal control and enterprise risk management (ERM), its influence on 
audit quality, its effect on the quality of external reporting, its influence on financial 
innovation and on other settings, such as interorganizational relationships. While the 
introduction of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act has created great interest in the topic for 
researchers in the United States, this review identifies a wide range of studies with 
more international heterogeneity, especially in more recent years.
Beyond that, the review shows that the understanding of internal control is cur-
rently divided between the narrow understanding of internal control as internal 
control specifically over financial reporting and the more global understanding of 
internal control on a strategic level, which is presumably the outcome of larger insti-
tutional developments. At the same time, internal control is a practice that is exe-
cuted by individual actors, who need to make sure that the controls present not only 
an act of compliance but an added value to their organization. Hence, the analysis 
of internal control through the lens of institutional work presents evidence for the 
different ways actors in organizations work with internal control at the micro level. 
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This review is thus relevant for researchers, managers, policymakers, and other 
stakeholders who are interested in the practice of internal control.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the first section, I pro-
vide the reader with a more detailed introduction to the theoretical lens of institu-
tional work. In the second, I describe the methodology of the systematic literature 
review that I use to categorize the literature. Third, I present and discuss the find-
ings. Finally, I draw conclusions and offer possible directions for future research.
2  Theoretical considerations
Somewhat lost in the development of an institutional perspective has been the 
lived experience of organizational actors, especially the connection between 
this lived experience and the institutions that structure and are structured by it. 
(T. Lawrence et al. 2011, p. 52)
Schäffer et al. (2015) show that control systems can be perceived as ‘socially con-
structed patterns’ (p. 396). This has the implication that in situations of ‘institutional 
complexity,’ that is, situations in which actors have to deal with several institutional 
pressures at the same time, different organizations might respond in different ways 
in an attempt to not only comply with regulations but also to achieve their legitimate 
goals. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) argue that this ‘institutionalization’ of activi-
ties and processes, such as internal control, is especially visible at the micro level of 
organization, where individuals apply the practices in their everyday work.
The theoretical perspective of institutional work invites researchers to shift their 
focus away from the developments that happen on the macro level of organizational 
fields toward the relationships between institutions and individual actors (Lawrence 
et al. 2011). More specifically, the original approach (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) 
emphasized that the focus for the study of institutional work is, in contrast to other 
institutional studies, on the ways institutions are affected by action and actors (Law-
rence et al. 2009). Essential for this relationship is the notion that individual actors 
possess agency. The idea is that these actors can critically reflect on their actions and 
are thus able to influence (i.e., create, maintain, and disrupt) their institutional envi-
ronment through their individual actions (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006).
Being focused ‘on activity, rather than accomplishment’ (Lawrence et  al. 
2009, p. 11), the concept of institutional work suggests that the actors need to 
be reflexive about how they are embedded in the institutions and that they must 
possess a degree of intentionality in their actions to be able to change existing 
institutions. Discussing the underlying issue of agency, Emirbayer and Mische 
(1998) show that intentionality is the combination of three cognitive processes 
that are based on a temporal perspective. The first process relates to the past of 
the actors and describes how they are able ‘to recall, to select, and to appro-
priately apply the more or less tacit and taken-for-granted schemas of action 
that they have developed through past interactions’ (p. 975). The second pro-
cess relates to the present and requires the actors to reflect critically on habits 
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that they take for granted. Finally, the third process relates to the future-oriented 
intentionality, suggesting that the actors need to be able to use their experience 
to create solutions for complex situations in the future.
Based on such an understanding of intentionality and agency, Lawrence et  al. 
(2009) suggest that there are two possible approaches to studying the role of the 
actors in institutional work. The first approach limits its scope to ‘institutional work 
that is motivated significantly by its potentially institutional effects’ (p. 13). In this 
approach, the boundaries of institutional work are narrower as it assumes that any 
action an actor performs unintentionally is not to be perceived as institutional work, 
even if it has a significant influence on institutions. In contrast, the second possible 
approach assumes a broader definition for institutional work, taking into account all 
actions that actors perform to influence institutions, whether they are intentional or 
not. Lawrence et al. (2009) suggest that the latter approach is too conservative, but 
Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013) disagree and find that actors are often engaged in 
institutional work without actual intentionality. The authors argue that actors can 
often influence institutions by performing their practical work without having criti-
cally reflected on what the ultimate consequences of their actions are. Instead, they 
suggest that the study of institutional work should incorporate the primary objec-
tives of the performed work.
Lawrence et al. (2011) suggest that the key issue for studies on institutional work 
is to focus on the work that happens in the course of institutional change, as this 
can give new insights ‘into the recursive relationship between forms of institutional 
work and patterns of institutional change and stability’ (p. 55). To achieve this focus, 
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) suggest the following taxonomy of different types of 
institutional work for each of the three categories of activity of creating, maintain-
ing, and disrupting institutions (Table 1).
In light of the main arguments about institutional work presented above, I suggest 
that this framework is appropriate as a lens to analyze the literature that focuses on 
the organization and adoption of internal control, as well as how it changes, in vari-
ous organizational contexts.
3  Methodology
In order to review scientific contributions in the field of internal control, I apply 
the methodology of a systematic literature review (SLR). According to Littell et al. 
(2008), systematic literature reviews aim ‘to comprehensively locate and synthesize 
research that bears on a particular question, using organized, transparent, and rep-
licable procedures at each step in the process’ (p. 1). Booth et al. (2012), however, 
highlight the fact that comprehensiveness in systematic literature reviews does not 
mean to identify ‘all studies’ (p. 24) on a specific topic, since this goal is not realis-
tic. Instead, researchers should aim to find literature that fits most appropriately with 
the defined topic. To achieve such a fit, Fink (2010) suggests a four-stage process 
toward the SLR methodology that I use to structure the paper. Using this method, 
I first select research questions, databases, and search terms on the topic of internal 
control. I then use practical screening to identify the articles that should be included 
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or excluded from the study. Next, I systematically analyze the content of the studies 
through the application of a review protocol. Finally, I synthesize the findings by 
applying institutional work as a theoretical framework.
Table 1  Categories of institutional work (Adapted from Lawrence and Suddaby 2006)
Forms of institutional work Definition
Creating institutions
 Advocacy The mobilization of political and regulatory support through 
direct and deliberate techniques of social suasion
 Defining The construction of rule systems that confer status or identity, 
define boundaries of membership or create status hierarchies 
within a field
 Vesting The creation of rule structures that confer property rights
 Constructing identities Defining the relationship between an actor and the field in 
which that actor operates
 Changing normative associations Re-making the connections between sets of practices and the 
moral and cultural foundations for those practices
 Constructing normative networks Constructing of interorganizational connections through which 
practices become normatively sanctioned and which form the 
relevant peer group with respect to compliance, monitoring 
and evaluation
 Mimicry Associating new practices with existing sets of taken-for-
granted practices, technologies and rules in order to ease 
adoption
 Theorizing The development and specification of abstract categories and 
the elaboration of chains of cause and effect
Maintaining institutions
 Enabling work The creation of rules that facilitate, supplement and support 
institutions, such as the creation of authorizing agents or 
diverting resources
 Policing Ensuring compliance through enforcement, auditing and 
monitoring
 Deterring Establishing coercive barriers to institutional change
 Valourizing and demonizing Providing for public consumption positive and negative exam-
ples that illustrate the normative foundations of an institution
 Mythologizing Preserving the normative underpinnings of an institution by 
creating and sustaining myths regarding its history
 Embedding and routinizing Actively infusing the normative foundations of an institution 
into the participants’ day to day routines and organizational 
practices
Disrupting institutions
 Disconnecting sanctions Working through state apparatus to disconnect rewards and 
sanctions from some set of practices, technologies or rules
 Disassociating moral foundations Disassociating the practice, rule or technology from its moral 
foundation as appropriate within a specific cultural context
 Undermining assumptions and beliefs Decreasing the perceived risks of innovation and differentiation 
by undermining core assumptions and beliefs
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3.1  Stage 1: Selecting research questions, databases and search terms
In order to inquire about the main research question of the study in more detail, 
I suggest several sub-research questions. Because the topic of internal control is 
highly interdisciplinary, with many different understandings of the actual concept, I 
suggest a first, rather broad, sub-research question to identify these variations:
1. ‘What are the different meanings of internal control and how can it be defined?’
In addition to that, I suggest several generic sub-research questions that relate to 
the theoretical framework of this study:
2. ‘How is internal control institutionalized?’
a. Who are the actors?
b. How are internal control processes created?
c. How are internal control processes maintained?
d. How are internal control processes disrupted?
3. ‘What do we learn from this for future research?’
To find appropriate literature on the concept of internal control, I searched the 
database Web of Science for the term ‘internal control’ in the title, abstract, or key-
words of scientific articles in peer-reviewed journals. To ensure the quality of the 
findings, and in line with the methodological choices made by other researchers 
(e.g. Mauro et al. 2016), other types of literature, such as conference proceedings or 
books, have not been reviewed.
3.2  Stage 2: Applying practical screening
To identify state-of-the-art publications, I set the starting date to the year 2000, 
because there have been several regulatory changes for internal control afterwards, 
such as the introduction of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in the United States and the 
Turnbull Report in the United Kingdom, which changed the role of internal con-
trol significantly. While the articles that are included in the study are selected from 
internationally recognized journals in a variety of disciplines, they should all focus 
on the topic of management control. Studies that were based on technical internal 
control in a medical, biological, or engineering environment were thus excluded 
from the study. To ensure the quality of the search results, I included only articles 
published in journals that are ranked level 3 or higher by the 2018 ABS Academic 
Journal Guide. The ABS Academic Journal Guide, however, is based in the UK and 
thus a certain bias toward Anglo-American research journals could be expected in 
its rankings. Therefore, in a second step, I also included articles published in jour-
nals that are ranked level B or higher according to the 2019 ABDC journal quality 
list, which is provided by the Australian business dean council. According to the 
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official guidelines of the ABDC list, levels A and B correspond to well over 50% of 
the recognized journals and include both high-quality academic and more special-
ized, practice-oriented journals. Using these rankings, I identified 184 articles that 
discuss internal control in different settings. However, after a first round of screening 
based on the abstracts of the articles, I identified 50 articles that were not relevant 
for the current study, such as cases that discuss the internal locus of control for the 
psychology of individuals, but not internal control from a management accounting 
perspective. In total, this left 135 articles for analysis after the practical screening.
3.3  Stage 3: Applying methodological screening
In order to be able to analyze the content of the literature systematically, I developed 
a review protocol comparable to those used in previous systematic reviews (see e.g. 
Stechemesser and Guenther 2012). The protocol comprises three main sections. The 
first section holds information on the bibliographic data of the article, that is, the 
author(s), year, title, author(s) geographic origin, and the name of the journal that 
published the article. In addition, I recorded the methodology and theory (if any), 
as well as the country and industry (if relevant) the article analyzed. In the second 
section, I examined the definition of internal control and potentially any alternative 
terms used for the concept of internal control. If the author gave an explicit defi-
nition of internal control, I recorded this as an explicit definition. In cases when 
authors described internal control closely but did not directly define it, I recorded it 
as an implicit definition. In addition to that, I was looking for potential alternative 
terms that essentially describe the concept of internal control in different words. I 
also registered the focus and content of the studies I analyzed. Finally, I aimed to 
extract any information that the literature provided regarding how the actors work 
with and institutionalize internal control on a daily basis.
3.4  Stage 4: Synthesize the results
In line with previous systematic literature reviews (e.g. Stechemesser and Guenther 
2012), I structure this final step of the literature review around the review protocol. 
I start by providing the reader with a brief overview of the bibliographic data and 
the background of the literature I analyze. I then present the findings of the content 
analysis and discuss them in the light of the institutional work perspective.
3.5  Bibliographic data and background of the studies
The literature review includes a total of 135 studies published between the years 
2000 and 2019. Figure 1 shows several trends in the literature on internal control. 
Interestingly, while there are no published articles in the year 2002 when the Sar-
banes–Oxley Act was introduced in the United States, the topic quickly gained 
momentum and reached a small peak with 14 studies appearing in the year 2009. 
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, the literature appears to 
have lost some interest in the topic with only 4 published studies in 2012 and 2015. 
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However, since then the interest has grown, with 18 research studies being published 
in 2019. The trendline indicates that interest in the concept of internal control is 
clearly increasing, suggesting that research will continue to grow in the coming 
years.
The distribution of the geographical origin of the first author of the publication 
(Fig. 2) shows that the sample of articles is clearly flawed, in that that most of the 
authors (55%) come from the United States. Twenty-five of the studies have authors 
with origins in a European country. However, it also needs to be mentioned here 
that nine of these twenty-five authors (36%) have their origin in the UK. Hence, it 
is indicated that the field of internal control is strongly influenced by Anglo-Saxon 
accounting research traditions in line with findings of Alexander and Archer (2000). 
This body of literature also includes studies with first authors from China (18), Can-
ada (4), Australia (4), Belgium (3), Finland (2), Singapore (2), South Korea (2), The 
Netherlands (2), Tunisia (2), and many other countries, as summed up in Fig. 2.
An analysis of the journals that publish the articles shows the interdisciplinary 
nature of the concept internal control. In total, the 135 articles were published in 
51 different journals representing disciplines ranging from accounting and auditing 
to finance, business ethics, and information systems and technologies. The journals 
that published most of the analyzed articles are summarized in Fig.  3. The wide 
range of journals also suggests that there are no high-quality journals (i.e., ABS 
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Breaking down the applied methodology of the studies shows that empiri-
cal research strongly influences the literature on internal control. A substantial 
majority of the sample (approximately 90%) of the studies I analyzed are of an 
empirical nature, and can be described as economic models, case studies, sur-
veys, or experiments. Notably, however, only a few (mostly European) studies 
build their reasoning on qualitative data collected either through interviews or 
ethnographic work. Other studies that are included in the main sample are either 
of a conceptual nature or present practical solutions with respect to IT systems.
Theories are not widely used in the literature on internal control and it was 
not possible to identify a theoretical framework in most of the studies I ana-
lyzed. For the remaining studies, and in line with the findings of previous lit-
erature reviews (Niamh and Solomon 2008), the most popular lens of analysis 
is Agency Theory. Besides, the studies rely on e.g., Accounting Theory, Eco-
nomic Theory, Contingency Theory, and Neo-institutional Theory for their 
analysis. Additionally, I recorded the setting of the studies I analyzed by both 
countries and industries that literature has focused on. The analysis (highlighted 
in Fig. 4) shows that most of the publications have focused on the United States 
(82), China (7), The Netherlands (3) and the UK (3). In addition, there are 8 
studies with an international focus and 9 studies that do not focus on a specific 
geographic region. The studies analyze mostly private, listed companies without 
specific industrial focus, since, according to SOX, such firms are, in the United 
States, required to report on their internal control situation, which makes it rela-
tively simple to access the data. Studies that do focus on specific industrial set-
tings examine the public sector (both federal and municipal), financial services, 
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4  Findings
4.1  The meaning of internal control
Maijoor (2000) argues that while the research on internal controls has covered 
various aspects of accounting concepts on different organizational levels, it lacks 
structure. My review shows that this lack of structure and the limited possibility 
for ‘cross-fertilization’ between the different research streams is still problematic in 
the field. I was able to identify several different streams that analyze the concept of 
internal control (see Table 2 for an overview). First, there is research that discusses 
internal control in the light of enterprise-risk management (ERM), how it relates 
to it and where the differences are. Second, an abundant line of research discusses 
internal control with respect to auditing and what effect the introduction of the Sar-
banes–Oxley Act (2002) has on both audit quality and the quality of external report-
ing for the firm. Third, other contemporary lines of research discuss internal con-
trol issues from the perspectives of interorganizational relationships and financial 
innovation.
Besides the fact that internal control is divided into different research streams 
in the literature, it is also certain that there is no agreement on a single definition 
of the concept. This appears to be mainly due to the fact that internal control has 
been strongly influenced by institutional pressures related to such developments 
as the introduction of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the implementation of the EU 
Audit Directive, as well as continuously updated versions of the COSO frame-
work, the modernized shareholder rights directive and regulations on sustainable 
finance. Hence, the literature on the concept, and perhaps that of internal control 
as such, has developed in different directions in different geographical regions. 
Studies in the research streams of auditing and external reporting, for instance, 
are largely influenced by researchers from the United States. Here, the common 
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Table 2  Overview over the identified research streams in the field of internal control
Research stream Topic
Internal control and its relation to ERM Organizational culture for internal control
(Wang and Hooper 2017; Lisic et al. 2016; Reginato 
et al. 2016; Pasiouras and Gaganis 2013; Adams 
et al. 2013; Roberts and Candreva 2006)
Internal control as element of ERM
(Mikes 2009; Spira and Page 2003)
Contingent environment
(Wang et al. 2018; Agyemang and Broadbent 2015; 
Brown et al. 2014; Woods 2009; Roberts and 
Candreva 2006; Bowrin 2004; DeHart-Davis and 
Bozeman 2001)
Corporate Governance
(Monem 2011; Jones 2008; Fernandez and Arrondo 
2005; Deakin and Konzelmann 2004; Oliverio 2001)
ERP systems
(Pernsteiner et al. 2018; Dutta et al. 2017; Chang et al. 
2014; Boritz et al. 2013; Kerr and Murthy 2013; 
Masli et al. 2010; Heise et al. 2014; Benaroch et al. 
2012)
Risk reporting
(Lawrence et al. 2018; Deumes and Knechel 2008; 
Abraham and Cox 2007; Solomon et al. 2000)
Peer pressure and occupational community
(Gao and Zhang 2019; Yu et al. 2019; Campbell et al. 
2016)
Regulatory frameworks
(Balakrishnan et al. 2019; Lentner et al. 2019; Dickins 
and Fay 2017)
Operational efficiency
(Chang et al. 2019; Cheng et al. 2018; Chong et al. 
2018; Länsiluoto et al. 2016; Feng et al. 2015; Lin 
et al. 2015)
Interaction between internal control and auditing Effect of PCAOB inspections
(Defond and Lennox 2017; López and Peters 2010)
Role of internal control for the audit committee
(Lisic et al. 2019; Cheng et al. 2019; Bruynseels and 
Cardinaels 2014; Sarens et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 
2007)
Factors that influence risk-fraud assessments
(Gramling and Schneider 2018; Munsif et al. 2013; 
Trotman and Wright 2012; Argyrou and Andreev 
2011; Kanagaretnam et al. 2010; Huang et al. 
2009; Naiker and Sharma 2009; Wolfe et al. 2009; 
Krishnan 2005)
Balance between internal control and audit effort and 
pricing
(Bhaskar et al. 2019; Lee 2018; Ji et al. 2018; Knechel 
et al. 2009; Hunton et al. 2008; Hoitash et al. 2008; 
Pae and Yoo 2001)
Importance of auditing for internal control
(Oussii and Taktak 2018; Schroeder and Shepardson 
2016; Haislip et al. 2016; Holm and Laursen 2007; 
Jensen and Payne 2003)
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Table 2  (continued)
Research stream Topic
Disclosure of internal control weaknesses and its 
effect on the quality of external reporting
Relationship between firm characteristics and internal 
control deficiencies
(Baker et al. 2018; Chernobai et al. 2011; Goh and Li 
2011; Petrovits et al. 2011; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2009; Feng et al. 2009; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; 
Leone 2007; Bronson et al. 2006)
Influence of SOX 404 and 302
(Chen et al. 2019; Clinton et al. 2014; Gupta et al. 
2013; Bedard and Graham 2011; Kim et al. 2011; 
Wang 2010; Hoitash et al. 2009; Kim and Park 
2009; Shapiro and Matson 2008; Beneish et al. 
2008; Patterson and Smith 2007; Ogneva et al. 
2007)
Effects on different stakeholders
(Li et al. 2019b; Lai 2019; Darrough et al. 2018; 
Lenard et al. 2016; Su et al. 2014; Costello and 
Wittenberg-Moerman 2011; Lopez et al. 2009; 
Schneider and Church 2008)
Importance of qualified employees
(Chen et al. 2016; Hoitash 2011; Maas and Matějka 
2009)
Effects on financial reporting
(Ashfaq and Rui 2019; Wilford 2016; Holder et al. 
2016; Marinovic 2013; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Doyle 
et al. 2007a, b)
Importance of regulation and competition
(Khlif et al. 2019; Garg 2018; Kim and Kim 2017; 
Bauer 2016; Marshall and Cali 2015; Abrahamsen 
and Aven 2012; van de Poel and Vanstraelen 2011; 
Altamuro and Beatty 2010; Rothenberg 2009)
Internal control in interorganizational relation-
ships and different regulatory environments
Influence of power
(Kraus and Strömsten 2016)
Importance of national regulation
(Soltani 2014; Crilly 2011)
Local implementation
(Bure and Tengeh 2019; Grace and Davis 2019; Elder 
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control over financial reporting (ICFR), meaning ‘the policies, processes, and 
procedures intended to ensure financial statements are reliable’ (e.g. Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2013, p. 91). The Sarbanes–Oxley Act required managers of compa-
nies in the United States are required to attach a report on their personal percep-
tion of the current internal control situation of the company and whether there are 
any weaknesses that stakeholders should be aware of. This has meant that internal 
control is mostly seen as a way to ensure that the financial statements that are 
reported by management are correct. Interestingly, there is a great variety in the 
use of actual terms related to internal control in the literature that has its setting 
in the US. Some studies do strictly adhere to the term internal control over finan-
cial reporting or ICFR (e.g. Kanagaretnam et al. 2010). Others perceive internal 
control as a way to have control over the reporting of financial statements, but are 
more liberal in their choice of terms, which may include internal control, internal 
control mechanism, or internal control system (e.g. Marinovic 2013; Doyle et al. 
2007a; Scholten 2005).
However, while an agreement on the meaning of internal control as ICFR appears 
to be true for private and publicly listed companies that need to report according to 
SOX 404, there are indications that this might not be true for organizations in the 
US that do not report. For instance, writing about the issue of how internal controls 
might be controlled in a public sector environment, Roberts and Candreva (2006) 
use the much broader definition of the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
(1999). Here, internal control is defined as ‘an integral component of an organiza-
tion’s management that provides reasonable assurance that the following objectives 
are being achieved: effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial 
reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations.’ Internal control in 
the public sector is thus not only concerned with the simple control over financial 
statements, but has a much more strategic aspect as it is also concerned with both 
the operations of the organization and compliance with current laws and regula-
tions. Similarly, Petrovits et al. (2011) use an updated version of this definition, that 
exchanges ‘an integral component’ with ‘a process,’ for the analysis of internal con-
trol in nonprofit organizations. Again, in this type of organization, internal control is 
concerned with compliance with rules and regulations, efficiency in operations, and 
the reliability of financial statements.
While the literature in the United States is strongly affected by the Sar-
banes–Oxley Act (2002), this is definitely not the case for the literature from authors 
outside of the US, where the Act does not apply. Here, internal control is rarely per-
ceived as being solely responsible for the correct reporting of financial statements. 
On the contrary, the literature from the rest of the world appears to assume a much 
broader perspective toward the concept. While the objectives of internal control 
that are outlined by international frameworks, such as the COSO framework, are 
the same as defined by GAO, it appears that they are still broader in scope. This is 
due to the fact that internal control, according to COSO, concerns the whole control 
environment, and that a major aspect of the concept internal control is the assess-
ment of risks. Internal control is thus closely connected to risk management. This is 
clearly observable from the way authors from countries outside of the US perceive 
internal control in their studies.
1 3
Internal control through the lens of institutional work: a…
Writing about the history of internal control, accountability, and corporate gov-
ernance in the UK, Jones (2008) shows that internal control is among the most 
important features for ensuring accountability in organizations, as well as for moni-
toring and controlling an organization’s operations. The author further points out 
that the specifics of an internal control system include both financial and non-finan-
cial controls, highlighting the holistic nature of internal control, which is closely 
connected to the ideas of enterprise risk management (ERM) (see also e.g. Mikes 
2009). Correspondingly, from the perspective of internal auditing, Sarens et  al. 
(2009) refer to internal control as internal control and risk management systems, 
indicating that the ideas of internal control and enterprise risk management (ERM) 
are essentially the same in practice. Similar terms have been used by Chernobai 
et  al. (2011), who frequently refer to the concept as risk management controls or 
internal risk management systems.
However, while most authors from geographical regions outside of the US per-
ceive internal control as a holistic concept that concerns the efficiency of whole 
organizations, exceptions to this do exist. Argyrou and Andreev (2011) argue that 
IT systems that companies implement to support their internal control mechanisms 
should be built in such a way that they ensure ‘the completeness, accuracy, and time-
liness of a company’s financial reporting,’ thus stressing ICFR as the most important 
feature of internal control.
Interestingly, while research on internal control in the United States appears to 
be strongly influenced by the introduction of SOX in 2002, a similar development is 
now apparent outside the US, as well. Recent institutional developments, such as the 
integration of the EU audit directive in the national laws of its respective member 
states, as well as the modernized directives on shareholder rights and regulations 
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toward a sense of internal control more closely related to ICFR. The following Fig. 5 
depicts this change of understanding over time.
For instance, analyzing the effect that regulatory changes for internal control cer-
tification have on earnings management, Garg (2018) utilizes a unique data set from 
Australia. At the same time, however, the study builds on prior US studies that have 
their focus on financial reporting rather than a holistic understanding of internal 
control.
4.2  Institutionalization of internal control at the micro level
Based on these findings, it is clear that the previous literature perceives internal 
control from mainly two perspectives: it is used either to ensure reliable financial 
reporting or as a holistic mechanism that ensures the efficient operation of the whole 
organization. On the other hand, Woods (2009) argues that practice requires respon-
sible actors to work with an application of the chosen control systems on a day-to-
day basis. She thus states that it must be assumed that in this day-to-day application 
there are deviances between what the control system does in theory and how it is 
used in real life. In the following section, therefore, I look more closely at what we 
can learn from the previous literature about the practice of internal control and how 
individuals work with it.
4.2.1  Who are the actors?
Board of directors In a classic paper on the failure of internal controls, Jensen 
(1993) states that the ‘problems with corporate control systems start with the board 
of directors,’ as it ‘has final responsibility for the functioning of the firm’ (p. 862). 
Indeed, researchers have found evidence for the importance of boards for internal 
control systems. Marciukaityte et al. (2006), for instance, show that if a control sys-
tem has failed, restructurings in the composition of the board, e.g., through the addi-
tion of external directors, can have a positive effect on the organization’s reputation. 
Fresh directors give the image of a different and perhaps better corporate govern-
ance. Also Scholten (2005) finds that boards hold an important position for the insti-
tutionalization of internal control, because they can act as ‘disciplinary agents’ who 
can adapt the salaries and bonuses of managers, and dismiss those who do not com-
ply with corporate policies.
In addition to that, both Monem (2011) and Chen et al. (2016) find that diversity 
on the board has an immediate influence on the performance of the internal con-
trol system. Discussing the importance of the board during the collapse of the 
Australian mobile operator One.Tel., Monem (2011) states that a major problem 
was a lack of diversity of opinion on the board. Instead of asking questions that 
might have uncovered underlying issues in the company, the board followed the 
management of the CEO and the organization subsequently collapsed. Chen et al. 
(2016) has suggested a potential solution to this problem. The author states that 
companies with at least one female member on the board have significantly fewer 
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material weaknesses and more efficient operations. While the study does not 
identify an optimal number of female board members or determine whether male 
members have a positive influence at all, it suggests that females are more likely 
to ask the uncomfortable questions, as they tend to be fiscally more conservative 
and less tolerant of opportunistic behavior than their male counterparts.
At the same time, studies by Fernandez and Arrondo (2005) and Deakin and 
Konzelmann (2004) suggest that while the board constitutes a major actor that 
will be often blamed for failures, the board is not alone in the internal control 
system. In fact, Fernandez and Arrondo (2005) show that other internal controls 
can substitute for the board and that the existence of many alternatives mitigates 
the potential issues of one faulty type of control in the organization. Deakin and 
Konzelmann (2004) similarly argue that responsibility for Enron’s collapse was 
pinned on its board based on false merits. The authors suggest that, being non-
executives, the board members were never correctly informed about the opera-
tions at the company and they lacked both knowledge and experience to be mean-
ingfully held responsible for Enron’s fall.
However, while this indicates the importance of the board of directors as actor 
for the institutionalization of internal controls, the literature analyzed here indi-
cates that several additional actors also significantly affect the internal control 
systems in the firm: namely, (top) management, internal auditors, and the audit 
committee, as well as external actors.
Top management Analyzing the literature, it becomes evident that internal con-
trol is perceived to be largely influenced by the actions of a firm’s top management, 
including the CEO and the CFO of the firm. Writing about how internal controls 
should be controlled in a public setting, Roberts and Candreva (2006) point out that 
the management of an organization is ‘not only responsible for implementing inter-
nal controls to provide reasonable assurance that the agency is meeting its intended 
objectives, it is also responsible for self-assessing, correcting, and reporting on the 
efficacy of those controls’ (p. 463). Several authors highlight the importance of 
the whole top management team (e.g. Pernsteiner et al. 2018; Petrovits et al. 2011; 
Chernobai et al. 2011; Huang et al. 2009; Mikes 2009; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; 
Patterson and Smith 2007; Roberts and Candreva 2006), since it possesses the nec-
essary executive power to implement or deny changes in control systems. Moreover, 
top management is said to have unique interests in a firm’s well-being, especially 
if a significant amount of wealth is bound up in stock holdings (Chernobai et  al. 
2011). While this might have positive effects on the internal control system of a 
firm, Campbell et al. (2016) are concerned about the fact that ‘executives still make 
decisions whether or not to comply with reporting standards, best practices, industry 
norms and legislation’ (p. 271).
Other authors highlight the importance of single top managers. Wang (2010), for 
instance, points out that chief financial officers are likely to have superior knowledge 
of a firm’s internal control systems. The author posits that this poses a danger to 
the firm, because CFOs of organizations with weak internal control systems suppos-
edly receive lower salaries and experience higher turnover rates than CFOs in firms 
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with strong internal controls. CFOs are thus likely to withhold private information 
on internal control deficits.
More recent strands of literature discuss the CFO’s role in internal control in light 
of their occupational community. Campbell et al. (2016) argue that the occupational 
community has a positive influence on the internal control system as it relaxes the 
hierarchical relationship between the CEO and the CFO. They argue that CFOs may 
often be pressured by their hierarchical superiors and therefore tend to do things that 
they might perceive to be unethical. When they have a community surrounding them 
that faces similar issues, however, they are less likely to feel pressured. This would 
in turn be positive for the performance of the company and particularly the report-
ing of its financials. Yu et al. (2019) also show that CFOs in the high-tech industry 
(which is characterized by a comparably high amount of material weaknesses), the 
occupational community can play a decisive role in the functioning of the internal 
control system. These authors suggest that the CFO is actually an under-researched 
concept and that people holding that position should be perceived as a loosely 
defined group whose only common characteristic is their title. The CFO is therefore 
more of a role than a profession, and not all CFOs are professionals in the area of 
accounting. The occupational community is thus highly important for them, as they 
might discuss issues outside of the firm’s environment and are therefore more likely 
to do the right thing.
General management In addition to top management, several authors (Wang and 
Hooper 2017; Kraus and Strömsten 2016; Su et  al. 2014; Argyrou and Andreev 
2011; Maas and Matějka 2009) point out the importance of other types of manage-
ment. Writing about the control mechanisms in interorganizational relationships, for 
example, Kraus and Strömsten (2016) mention the importance of operational man-
agers and how internal controls should be ‘systematically’ related to them (p. 70), 
as they are the personnel that work with the controls on a daily basis. In addition to 
that, Wang and Hooper (2017) show that, in the context of Chinese hotels, medium-
level managers are able to simply outmaneuver any internal controls that are put 
into place by the organizational headquarters. According to the authors, this is pos-
sible because of the unique Chinese cultural context, in which it is assumed that 
lower-level staff will keep silent about any misconduct on the part of management. 
Middle managers are thus free to conduct business any way they want, including to 
potentially change or implement new internal controls to ensure successful business 
without the guidance of corporate policy.
Pernsteiner et al. (2018) explore another interesting issue: the effect of ERP sys-
tems on the internal control system of organizations. They find that managers often 
have to implement workarounds because the initial ERP system does not allow 
for special requests. Due to the system’s high costs, top management can decline 
improvements to the ERP system and general managers then have to find manual 
alternatives to solve the problem. These workarounds often lead to further worka-
rounds and, in the end, the company is in fact using the customer as a final step of 
the internal control system. Such a situation can happen, for example, when a cus-
tomer cancels an order. The process of billing goes through several steps in the ERP 
system in addition to several manual workarounds and if it is not correctly executed 
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by the staff, the customer might be billed for a product they did not receive. If the 
customer notices that they have been wrongly invoiced, they then notify the com-
pany and the mistake will be fixed. The customer would thus become part of the 
internal control system.
Internal auditors Another important actor in the institutionalization of internal con-
trol in organizations is the internal auditor. In a recent study of the impact of the 
internal audit function on the quality of internal control, Oussii and Taktak (2018) 
find that improving the technical competence and efficiency of the work of internal 
auditors has an immediate positive influence on the internal control system and con-
tributes to more reliable financial reporting. One of the reasons for this finding is 
provided by Pae and Yoo (2001), who show that there is a constant tradeoff between 
investments in the internal control mechanisms by the owners of a given firm and the 
effort that is spent by auditors. The authors suggest that owners need to invest less 
in internal control if auditors have high legal liability and spend more effort to find 
any issues themselves. On the other hand, if auditors expend less effort, then owners 
should invest more in their internal control systems, in order to prevent irregulari-
ties. Similarly, Hunton et al. (2008) argue that a firm’s control system profits signifi-
cantly from increased monitoring efforts by the internal auditing function—though 
the increased costs of such continuous monitoring efforts could hinder the owners of 
the firm from stepping up those activities.
Woods (2009) also highlights the importance of the internal audit function for 
internal control. Analyzing the activities that the local government in Birmingham 
has applied to safeguard its operations against potential risks, she mentions that 
risk management experts, as part of the internal audit function, were responsible 
for the implementation and maintenance of all of the internal control activities that 
the council applied. In another case study concerning four different companies in 
Belgium, Sarens et al. (2009) acknowledge the role of internal auditors in the func-
tioning of internal control systems, showing that they can offer advice to both the 
operational staff and the audit committee. They thereby act as ‘comfort providers to 
the audit committee,’ which is otherwise not closely involved in the daily operations 
of middle management.
The audit committee The audit committee has control over the financial reporting 
process, selects internal auditors, and oversees the work of both internal and exter-
nal audits at a company. It should therefore have an important role in the functioning 
of the internal control system. Yet the evidence for this importance is twofold. On 
the one hand, some researchers study the effectiveness of the audit committee in 
light of the growing concern that the main reason for the existence of such commit-
tees is symbolic compliance with regulations, rather than fundamental oversight of 
the financial operations. Lisic et al. (2019), Lisic et al. (2016), and Bruynseels and 
Cardinaels (2014), for example, suggest that the expertise of audit committees does 
not automatically make the quality of the reporting process more reliable, that is, it 
does not mean that there will be fewer cases with reported material weaknesses. In 
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addition to that, Lisic et al. (2016) criticize the way boards and their subcommittees 
(such as the audit committee), are organized in the United States. They further argue 
that the United States is the only country in the world that allows a CEO to be simul-
taneously the chairman of the board. The authors suggest that this structure allows 
CEOs to adversely impact the work of the boards and audit committees and to make 
their efforts superficial.
While previous studies indicate a rather passive role for the audit committee, 
there is, on the other hand, evidence that the committee holds an important function 
for the successful functioning of internal control systems. Krishnan (2005) found 
that companies with independent audit committees and great financial expertise 
were significantly less likely to experience internal control problems than firms with 
lower-quality audit committees. Naiker and Sharma (2009) also analyze the signifi-
cance of the composition of the audit committee, finding that it is important to have 
former audit partners on the committee, even if those partners are affiliated with 
the firm’s external auditor. Because such former partners have significant knowledge 
of the operations of the firm, they are in a position to evaluate the reliability of its 
internal control and monitoring activities better than ‘novice auditors’ who have less 
knowledge of the firm.
External actors While the previous studies stress the importance of internal actors 
for the institutionalization of internal control, there is also evidence for the relevance 
of external actors and cooperation between different actors. Analyzing interorgani-
zational cooperation for internal control regulation in a US governmental environ-
ment, Faerman et al. (2001) find that public actors profit significantly from coopera-
tion with managers from the private sector. The authors argue that such cooperation 
between the different actors has the advantage of enabling public actors to focus 
on the interests of the public, while relying on the greater ‘technical expertise’ of 
private business managers. In addition to cooperation between public-sector and pri-
vate-sector actors, the authors also mention cooperation between different instances 
of the public sector, such as senators and the SEC, as well as guidance from union 
leaders who understand the practice. From the perspective of the private market 
in the US, Rothenberg (2009) shows that external competitors and customers can 
also be additional important actors. The author contents that customers will dis-
cipline a company for having weak internal controls by switching to competitors 
with stronger internal controls. This is inherently only possible in the United States, 
where management is required to report weaknesses to the public. This indicates, 
however, that the efforts of the US government have a very positive indirect influ-
ence on the institutionalization of strong internal controls.
One might also assume that external auditors—given that they work closely with 
and oversee companies—would have a significant impact on those companies’ inter-
nal control efforts. But Holm and Laursen (2007) show that internal auditors are 
increasingly taking over functions that used to be executed by external auditors and 
that the potential influence of the latter on an organization’s strategy is now largely 
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reduced. Yet while the corporate governance debate has strengthened the internal 
auditor in strategic terms, there is also evidence that external auditors have an indi-
rect influence on internal control systems. Jensen and Payne (2003), for example, 
show that in the setting of municipalities there is often a tradeoff situation between 
investing in and training an organization’s preexisting the personnel or simply hiring 
external auditors instead.
4.2.2  How is internal control created, maintained, or disrupted?
In their framework for institutional work, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) suggest that 
actors possess a certain amount of reflexivity about and awareness of the institutions 
around them and are thus able to adapt them in a new and potentially better direction 
by either creating, maintaining, or disrupting the existing institutions. The literature 
on internal control describes these reflexive and purposive actions in several ways.
Creation of internal control practices Su et al. (2014) make the case that it is dif-
ficult for actors in the current business environment to create internal control. The 
authors agree that actors, such as firm management, can beneficially adopt ideas 
from available frameworks like COSO and the more technically oriented CoBIT. 
Adopting ideas from these frameworks would be what T. Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006) describe as mimicry, since they are widely adopted and using ideas from the 
frameworks can facilitate the adoption of new practices. However, there is a con-
cern that on the practical level these frameworks do not give sufficient guidance for 
the actual application and design of specific tools. The actors thus need to engage 
in other types of work to make the institutionalization of internal control systems 
successful.
Given that the actors already have sufficient background knowledge about the 
creation of internal controls, the literature points toward some important concepts 
that enable actors to create successful practices. Kraus and Strömsten (2016), for 
instance, highlight the importance of power. In their study of the interorganizational 
relationship between Ericsson and Vodafone, these authors show that managers on 
the Vodafone side were able to coerce the supplier, Ericsson, to adopt formal inter-
nal control practices. Being one of the largest Ericsson’s largest customers, Voda-
fone was able to exercise a significant amount of power by threatening to switch sup-
pliers if Ericsson did not comply with their standards. This enabled the company to 
transform Ericsson’s informal control system, which focused mostly on engineering, 
into a formal, financially oriented control system. This kind of institutional work can 
be related to what Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) describe as constructing norma-
tive networks. It is clear in the study that the actors on the Vodafone side showed 
intentionality, especially with respect to the projective future-oriented perspective, 
since Vodafone’s managers knew right from the start in which direction Ericsson’s 
the internal control system needed to develop. Through normative sanctions and 




Other research argues that responsible actors do not need detailed knowl-
edge for the implementation of good internal controls. From the perspective of 
nonprofit organizations, Petrovits et  al. (2011) show that managers can receive 
‘in-kind support’ from companies that donate their services to nonprofit organi-
zations. This allows technical difficulties and questions regarding the internal 
control systems of an organization to be easily resolved. This kind of institutional 
work corresponds to Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) concept of advocacy, which 
involves obtaining external support ‘through direct and deliberate techniques of 
social suasion’ (p. 221). Petrovits et  al. (2011) show that the managers of non-
profit organizations can only receive support if they can reasonably outline the 
need for help in improving the internal control systems. It is thus clear that the 
actors in this case possess intentionality both with respect to the present—since 
they question their current position and see the need for change—as well as with 
respect to projective intentionality.
Maintenance of internal control practices One of the maintenance actions the litera-
ture describes internal control actors taking is disciplining managers. Marciukaityte 
et al. (2006) and Scholten (2005) both perceive internal control from the perspective 
of corporate governance. Marciukaityte et  al. (2006) argue that actors are able to 
maintain the internal control mechanism of the firm by making regular changes in 
the composition of the board of directors. It is apparent that such changes have a 
positive effect on the reputation of the firm, since customers perceive fresh directors 
as a positive strengthening of internal control practices. Scholten (2005) similarly 
describes how corporate boards are able to strengthen the internal corporate gov-
ernance mechanism of the firm by disciplining managers who are not complying 
with corporate policy. An actor can strengthen the corporate governance and inter-
nal control system of the firm by adjusting salary and bonus levels, as well as by fir-
ing any managers who pose a potential risk to the system. This kind of institutional 
work corresponds to what Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) identify as policing, that 
is, ‘ensuring compliance through enforcement, auditing and monitoring’ (p. 231).
Another important means of maintaining the internal control practices of an 
organization is the work of the internal audit function. In one of the cases outlined 
by Sarens et al. (2009), an internal auditor argues that top management is taking a 
more reactive than proactive approach to the internal control practices of the organi-
zation and therefore depends on the work of the internal auditor. The internal audi-
tor meets various individuals whose work involves similar activities, but who all 
employ different procedures. The internal auditor needs to find a way for internal 
control to keep control over these. In addition to having different procedures, it also 
becomes apparent that several employees in that case have no real idea of internal 
control and risk management. Here, the internal auditor has the important function 
of informing the employees about the controls that are in place. Because the internal 
auditor acts as an authorizing agent in this case and has the role of ensuring the sur-
vival of the institution of internal control, I would argue that the kind of institutional 
work that the internal auditor performs can be seen as enabling work.
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One way to improve the flow of information and control over various procedures 
is through the introduction of new IT software. Sarens et al. (2009) describe how the 
internal audit function was successfully able to be integrated into a formal system 
that was developed within the company. The system is updated on an annual basis 
and draws on information from several functions, including internal audit, the audit 
committee, and top management. In the case outlined in Woods (2009), the internal 
control practices were similarly maintained and gradually formalized through the 
introduction of a professional IT system that could process internal control and risk 
management issues more efficiently (see also Huang et  al. (2009) for an example 
of a possible detecting mechanism that can aid internal control). Pernsteiner et al. 
(2018) likewise show that the introduction of an ERP system shifts the work of man-
agement accountants away from routine processes that can be completed by the sys-
tem toward more strategic work. At the same time, their study also shows that if the 
ERP system is not thorough enough and top management decides to avoid pricey 
updates of the system, the management accountants will have to go back to their 
own manual ways of controlling the processes through spreadsheets. The lower-level 
management accountants thus need to exercise a great deal of reflection on the pro-
cess that is imposed on them and find solutions to make the process work. Unfortu-
nately, Pernsteiner et al. (2018) clearly show that the solution of having both an ERP 
system that is known to be faulty throughout the organization, and workaround solu-
tions on the local level, led to a situation of chaos in the company. This highlights 
the importance of routinely updating the IT system in order to avoid internal control 
flaws. Correspondingly, Roberts and Candreva (2006) highlight the importance of 
constant ‘self-assessing, correcting, and reporting on the efficacy of those controls’ 
(p. 463), a process that the authors call ‘controlling internal controls.’ In order to 
achieve such ‘control over internal controls,’ the authors show that the responsible 
actors are constantly updating their policies and procedures. In addition to that, there 
is a need to train employees who are involved in the internal control process but do 
not possess sufficient previous knowledge on internal control (see also Woods 2009).
Both the implementation of professional IT software that improves the flow of 
information for internal control and risk management and the process of controlling 
the internal controls correspond to the institutional work of embedding and routiniz-
ing. Here, the actors introduce the ‘normative foundations of an institution into the 
participants’ day-to-day routines and organizational practices’ (Lawrence and Sud-
daby 2006, p. 233) in order to stabilize and facilitate the practice of internal control. 
These actors (here especially the internal auditors) show the necessary purposive-
ness, since the introduction of professional software as well as the process of con-
tinuous controls is not cheap for the organizations and there must be a good reason 
for them to engage in this kind of institutional work.
Disruption of internal control practices Managers are able to disrupt existing inter-
nal control practices, in certain circumstances, as J. Wang and Hooper (2017) estab-
lish clearly. These authors, mentioned above, demonstrate that the hotel where the 
first author was employed and that belonged to a larger chain with corporate pol-
icies, in practice deviated strongly from these policies. The managers thus saw it 
as appropriate in certain instances to allow practices that are not tolerated by the 
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corporate code. The authors argue, however, that due to the specific culture of the 
Chinese hotel industry, managers on a higher level do not have to fear that staff will 
mention any breach of conduct to the corporate headquarters. This is because lower 
level staff can be easily replaced and is therefore encouraged to keep quiet. Since 
the managers in this context have the belief that their actions are appropriate, this 
kind of action relates to the institutional work of disassociating moral foundations. 
Interestingly, while Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) did not find many examples of 
this kind of work, they believed that it is performed by elites. J. Wang and Hooper 
(2017) show, however, that in the Chinese cultural context it is possible even for 
operational managers, who are not part of any elite.
Rather surprisingly, similar evidence is also found in the setting of the strongly 
regulated US market. Patterson and Smith (2007), as well as Campbell et al. (2016), 
Yu et al. (2019) and Lisic et al. (2016) highlight the issue that top managers could 
simply ‘override the system of internal controls’ (Patterson and Smith 2007, p. 428), 
if they had the intention to commit fraud. These authors thus suggest that actors with 
fraudulent intentions have an inherent interest in designing weaknesses into their 
internal control systems. Sarbanes–Oxley punishes firms for having internal control 
weaknesses because such weaknesses have to be reported to the public. However, if 
the standards become unattainable it becomes more attractive for the firms to choose 
control systems that are of weaker quality. This issue is summed up in a nutshell 
by Soltani (2014), who analyzed the similarities between six high-profile corporate 
scandals in the US and Europe. The author states that ‘the ethical dilemma has been 
coupled with ineffective boards, inefficient corporate governance and internal con-
trol, accounting irregularities, failure of external auditors, dominant CEOs, greed 
and a desire for power and the lack of a sound “ethical tone at the top” policy within 
the organization’ (p. 270).
5  Conclusion
This literature review set out to systematically structure the literature on the topic of 
internal control through the application of institutional work as theoretical frame-
work. One of the issues that was addressed is the problem of the term internal con-
trol having many different definitions, making the concept difficult to study. It was 
therefore my goal to find out how internal control might be defined in terms of how 
it is used in practice. My findings suggest that internal control currently has two dif-
ferent meanings based on the geographical division between the United States and 
the rest of the world. Strong institutional pressures in the US market (that is, the 
introduction of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002) has led US scholars to commonly 
define internal control as a mechanism to control the reliability of financial report-
ing, that is, internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). In markets that have 
experienced less regulatory pressure, internal control has developed into a broader 
concept that has many commonalities with related concepts such as enterprise risk 
management, or corporate governance. This review has thus shown that internal 
control in settings outside of the United States is generally perceived as a system 
1 3
Internal control through the lens of institutional work: a…
that ensures compliance with rules and regulations and efficiency in operations, as 
well as assessing risk and determining the reliability of financial statements. At the 
same time, recent institutional changes, such as the implementation of the EU Audit 
Directive into the national laws of the respective member states—as well as a mod-
ernized shareholder rights directive and regulations on sustainable finance—appear 
to have had an impact on international research on internal control. An analysis of 
the time dimension also showed that researchers from outside of the US have in 
recent years started to focus more intensively on ICFR in the context of internal 
control. This leaves open the question of whether there is indeed a need for a unified 
holistic definition of the concept with two substantially different conceptualizations 
of the term. However, the fact that the term internal control or internal control sys-
tem is often used interchangeably with an assumed definition of it as ICFR raises 
the concern that there may be potential misinterpretations in research and practice. 
Hence, while ICFR is a part of a holistic internal control system, it should be more 
clearly differentiated and identified as such.
The previous discussion on the term internal control shows the importance of 
strong external institutions for the development of internal control in practice. At 
the same time, companies need to make sure that their internal control efforts are 
not purely an act of formal compliance, but that they become an asset that leads 
to more efficient and sustainable operations. Hence, internal control is also insti-
tutionalized within organizations through the daily work of practitioners. By ana-
lyzing the literature through the theoretical lens of institutional work, I have been 
able to define various actors that are in practice responsible for internal control and 
its institutionalization within organizations. The literature on institutional work sug-
gests that these actors institutionalize work in three ways, by creating, maintaining, 
and disrupting institutions. In the case of internal control, the findings indicate that 
these actors create the practice of internal control through the institutional work of 
mimicry, advocacy, and constructing normative networks. Internal control practices 
are maintained through policing, and enabling work. Disruption of internal control 
is possible for managers in organizations with weak internal control systems, or 
unique cultural backgrounds, where the relevance of internal control is questionable, 
through the institutional work of disassociating moral foundations.
This review has shown that the actors working with internal control clearly pos-
sess the purposiveness to adapt internal control practices in their specific contexts. 
However, several of the types of institutional work that are suggested by T. Law-
rence and Suddaby (2006) could not be identified in the review. Hence, it must be 
assumed that while the actors in the field of internal control are reflexive and pur-
posive, their actions are largely limited by their institutional embeddedness. At the 
micro level, the actors can adjust internal control so that it represents an activity 
that creates value for the organizations. Yet major changes in the understanding and 
application of internal control are achieved through institutional pressures, such as 
changes in legislation, which the involved actors cannot significantly influence.
The study contributes to the research on internal control in several ways. The 
paper presents one of the first attempts to synthesize knowledge from multiple 
research streams in the field beyond the conceptualization of internal control as 
internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). In addition to that, the application 
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of the theoretical perspective of institutional work allowed for more in-depth analy-
sis of the articles and therefore better insights into the actual practice of internal 
control. As such it adds significant new insights to the practice of internal control, 
in comparison with previous literature reviews on the topic, which seek to structur-
ing the field systematically (see e.g. Chalmers et al. 2019). From a practical point of 
view, the study presents an aggregated understanding of the term internal control 
and therefore has significant practical implications, as it can supplement the efforts 
of regulators and practitioners to create and implement internal control procedures 
and frameworks that add value in the corporate governance of organizations.
5.1  Suggestions for future research
The review has shown that there is a great mixture of definitions for the concept of 
internal control. Several studies (e.g. Schroeder and Shepardson 2016; Marinovic 
2013; Ge and McVay 2005) use the term internal control system to describe ICFR. 
But ICFR is only one aspect of internal control; it does not represent the entire sys-
tem of controls that go into the concept. Future research should be more careful in 
defining the scope of research, in order to avoid false conclusions about the con-
ceptualization and practice of internal control. At the same time, the differing con-
ceptualizations of internal control prompt several suggestions for future research. 
For example, it would be interesting to investigate in greater detail why the Sar-
banes–Oxley Act, as well as more recent European legislation, has been so narrowly 
focused around internal control over financial reporting, instead of including more 
holistic ideas of internal control. In addition to that, several of the papers analyzed 
here, which have a focus on the US market, question the role of the audit committee 
for the effectiveness of internal control due to the possibility of having a CEO that 
can simultaneously be the chairman of the board. This research could be extended 
in a more international context to evaluate, for example, whether audit committees 
are perceived as similarly superficial in jurisdictions outside of the US. This would 
be relevant, for example, in light of the EU Audit Directive, which requires audit 
committees to monitor the effectiveness of internal control, especially with regard to 
internal control over financial reporting.
In addition to that, the review has identified several actors in organizations who 
directly impact the internal control system of organizations. But we lack research 
on external actors who are potentially able to institutionalize the development of 
internal control systems in organizations. Given the identified importance of internal 
auditors for the institutionalization of internal control in practice, it could, for exam-
ple, be interesting to explore in more detail the extent to which professional organi-
zations such as the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) influence the development of 
internal control practices for actors at the micro level.
During the course of this research, several additional themes emerged that could 
be relevant to explore in future research projects. For instance, there appear to be 
major differences between the way compliance to internal control is perceived 
in certain markets, such as in China (see e.g. Wang and Hooper 2017), imply-
ing that the topic of culture holds significant value in the conceptualization and 
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institutionalization of internal control. In this regard, it would be particularly inter-
esting to analyze the ways cultural differences prevent organizations from imple-
menting efficient internal controls. This review has shown that evidence is scarce 
for how internal controls are disrupted and how organizations can recover from situ-
ations when internal control systems have failed. Given the current development of 
globalization, many organizations could, in practice, profit from an increased under-
standing of why the same internal controls that are efficient in some regions tend to 
fail in others.
5.2  Limitations of the study
Like other systematic literature reviews, this study entails certain limitations. While 
the aim of the research methodology is to ‘comprehensively identify’ articles in the 
field of internal control, it needs to be acknowledged that the highly interdisciplinary 
nature of the field makes comprehensiveness implausible. Moreover, to limit the 
study to articles in the field of management control, all studies that were based on 
technical internal control in a medical, biological, or engineering environment were 
excluded. Articles that were published in languages other than English were also 
excluded to avoid a potential language bias. However, it is possible that the inclusion 
of articles in other languages would have resulted in another geographical distribu-
tion of the authors and could possibly have changed the conclusions of the study.
In addition to that, the study is limited by its methodological focus on high-
quality journals ranked level 3 or higher according to the 2018 ABS list of jour-
nals or level B or higher according to the 2019 ABDC journal quality list. While 
the inclusion of journals that have been ranked by either the British or the Austral-
ian rankings mitigates possible regional biases, it is possible that the inclusion of 
more articles from journals that are ranked lower would allow for new conclusions 
and insights. Further literature reviews in the area of internal control with a holis-
tic approach to the concept are thus still needed. While the current study includes 
professional journals in the area of financial accounting and auditing, there is room 
for further analysis of the potential differences between the conceptualization and 
institutionalization of internal control in the professional literature as compared to 
the academic literature.
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